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Abstract 
In 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an article claiming that each execution saves more 
than  70  lives.  This  example  is  used  to  show  how  easy  it  is,  using  simple  or  advanced 
econometric  techniques,  to  produce  results  that  do  or  do  not  support  the  deterrence 
hypothesis. Moreover, we also point to some puzzles which  have not been satisfactorily 
solved so far. We then present a critical survey of the papers published in the last ten years. 
It is shown how simple changes can produce quite different results using the same data. 
Finally, we draw some conclusions about the usefulness of statistical arguments in policy 
debates, but also on the moral questions involved in this particular debate. 
Keywords 
Death Penalty, Deterrence, Econometric Evidence, Ideology. 
JEL Classification 
K14; K42 1  Introduction 
[1] On November 2, 2007, R.D. ADLER and M. SUMMERS published an article in the Wall 
Street Journal with the title “Capital Punishment Works”.
1) With reference to the diagram in 
Figure 1 below, they state that over the period considered, from 1979 to 2004, “each execu 
tion seems to be associated with 71 fewer murders in the year the execution took place”, and 
that this association was significant at the 0.05 percent level. Acknowledging that there might 
be a problem of causality because some murders took place in the years of observation before 
the executions, they lagged the executions’ variable and got an even stronger result: “Each 
execution was associated with 74 fewer murders the following year”, statistically significant 
even at the 0.03 percent level. Their defence of the death penalty ended in the following (rhe 
torical) question: “Do we save this particular life at the cost of the lives of dozens of future 
murder victims?” 
 
Figure 1:   Executions and homicides, U.S.A., 1979 – 2004 
[2] Aside from this figure, the two authors do not provide any information about how they 
derive these results. As will be shown below, these are results of OLS regressions that are 
insufficient according to any standard of conventional econometric techniques. This is the 
more astonishing as, during recent years, there has been a rather intense debate on this issue, 
and questions of the appropriate econometric methodology played a major part in this de 
bate.
2) Neither of these two authors participated in it. Moreover, the second author, M. SUM 
                                                 
  1.  http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB119397079767680173 lMyQjAxMDE3OTAzMjkwNzIwWj.html 
(10/03/09). 
  2.  See, for example, H. DEZHBAKHSH, P. RUBIN and J.M. SHEPHERD (2003), J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS 
(2005,  2009),  L.  KATZ,  S.D.  LEVITT  and  E.  SHUSTOROVICH  (2003),  H.N.  MOCAN  and  R.K.  GITTINGS 
(2003), J.M. SHEPHERD (2004, 2005), P.R. ZIMMERMANN (2004, 2006, 2009), as well as the discussion in 
Economists' Voice, issue 3/5 (April 2006) between J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2006, 2006a) and P.H. 
RUBIN (2006, 2006a). – 2 – 
 
MERS, is said to be a professor of quantitative methods.
3) But without taking any methodologi 
cal problems into account and neglecting all that has been written before, publishing such a 
paper in the Wall Street Journal might be a better way to get a large audience and correspond 
ing response from the general public than having scientific scruples. 
[3] The ‘economic’ discussion about the possible deterrent effect of the death penalty started 
with the seminal paper by I. EHRLICH (1975), which itself was a response to a famous book by 
T. SELLIN (1959). Both used quite different statistical approaches.
4) And while T. SELLIN 
(1959) did not find a significant effect, I. EHRLICH (1975), using a time series of annual data 
from 1933 to 1967, found a “pure deterrent effect” and concluded that “on average the trade 
off between the execution of an offender and the lives of potential victims it might have saved 
was of the order of magnitude of 1 for 8” (p. 398) for this observation period.  
[4] This paper was the starting point for a huge debate in the late seventies and eighties. S. 
CAMERON (1994, p. 197f.) speaks of two generations of papers, the first one published be 
tween 1975 and 1978, i.e. around the time when the moratorium on capital punishment was 
lifted in the United States, and the second one after 1982, covering the time after the morato 
rium. The data used were partly time series, and partly cross section data, and all but a few 
studies, which looked at Canada or the United Kingdom, used U.S. data.
5) The results are 
rather mixed. In particular, they proved the fragility of the results of I. EHRLICH (1975) with 
respect to the specification of the test equation as well as the time period employed. Thus, 
while the overall results do not support his conclusion, they also do not give strong support to 
the opposite hypothesis. All that can be said is that the empirical evidence provided in this 
research does not lead to any strong conclusion.
6) 
[5] In recent years, a third generation of papers has been published on this topic.
7) The main 
difference to the first two waves is that now panel data are used, mostly for the U.S. states, 
but partly also for U.S. counties.
8) This allows to distinguish between those states with and 
those without the death penalty, i.e. it avoids an aggregation bias when using time series data 
resulting from mixing these two categories, which might bias the estimated coefficients (and 
t statistics) downwards. It can also take into account unobserved heterogeneity between the 
states which is not allowed for when using cross section data. The use of state (or county) 
fixed effects to take account of this unobserved heterogeneity might, on the other hand, also 
create a bias.  
                                                 
  3.  Actually, he is Professor of Management Science at Pepperdine University, but is also teaching statistics 
and quantitative methods. 
  4.  For a comparison of the two approaches see, for example, D.C. BALDUS and J.W. COLE (1975). 
  5.  Studies for Canada are, for example, K.L. AVIO (1979) or S. LAYSON (1983), studies for the United King 
dom are K.I. WOLPIN (1978, 1978a). 
  6.  For an overview of these results see, for example, the two surveys by S. CAMERON (1988, 1994). 
  7.  See the literature mentioned in Footnote 2 above and discussed in Section 3 of this paper. 
  8.  In recent years, there are only few studies using cross section of time series data. See, for example, P.K. 
NARAYAN and R. SMYTH (2006) or R. HJALMARSSON (2009). – 3 – 
 
[6] The results of this recent debate are, again, rather mixed. The old divide between the fac 
ulties which already characterised the earlier debates remains; while most (or perhaps nearly 
all) (U.S.) economists believe in the validity of the deterrence hypothesis and present corre 
sponding results, most, but not all, scientists from other faculties, in particular law, have seri 
ous doubts on its validity and demonstrate the fragility of the results presented by economists. 
However, contrary to earlier discussions, the econometric methods used are the same: Today, 
non economists  are  able  to  use  the  same  advanced  statistical  techniques  equally  well  as 
economists. Correspondingly, some of the discussions are about methodological problems, 
especially on the reliability of the data and the quality of the instruments used in instrumental 
variables estimations. 
[7] The debate about the deterrence effect is, however, just one of three such debates in the 
United States, where mainly ideology seems to drive the empirical results. The second one is 
about gun prevalence and homicides,
9) a discussion that is also relevant to Switzerland.
10) The 
third one is whether legalised abortion reduced crime.
11) All three debates are highly politi 
cised, and one could get the impression that in all three debates the authors mainly try to find 
scientific arguments to support their political convictions. This is not illegitimate, but it can 
easily lead to selective perceptions of the reality. 
[8] One can really gain the impression that the economics of crime and the question whether 
death penalty deters murders or not is just a romping place for ideologists. However, that 
prior beliefs might have an impact on the reported results on the deterrent effect of death pen 
alty has already been discussed by W.S. MCMANUS (1985). This does not imply that authors 
are necessarily shirking; it might simply be the result of selective perceptions: if contradictory 
results can be derived, authors choose those in the validity of which they are convinced a pri 
ori and are looking for strong arguments in order to support these results.  
[9] In the following, we first take the data and methodology used by R.D. ADLER and M. 
SUMMERS mentioned above and show how easy it is to produce contradictory results (Section 
2). From a methodological point of view, this goes even beyond what I. EHRLICH (1975) did 
when starting the economic discussion about this topic. However, due to the publication in the 
Wall Street Journal, the results of these two authors did get a far wider audience in the gen 
eral public than those of all other authors, and the simplicity of this approach makes it very 
easy to demonstrate the possibility of manipulations that are equally possible if we would 
employ more advanced techniques. Moreover, in this section we also point to some puzzles in 
                                                 
  9.  See, for example, I. AYRES and J.J. DONOHUE (2003, 2003a, 2009, 2009a), P.J. COOK and J. LUDWIG 
(2006), M. DUGGAN (2001), T. KOVANDZIC, M.E. SCHAFFER and G. KLECK (2008), F. PLASSMANN and J. 
WHITLEY (2003), C. MOODY and TH.B. MARVELL (2008, 2009) or L. STOLZENBERG and S.J. D’ALESSIO 
(2000).  
 10.  In Switzerland, people serving in the army usually have their military guns or handguns at home even after 
they have definitely finished their military service. However, a considerable proportion of homicides and 
suicides are performed by using these weapons, and – in international comparison – Switzerland has a rela 
tively high rate of gun suicides and homicides. Nevertheless, in February 2011, a popular initiative to se 
verely restrict having military guns at home failed. 
 11.  See, for example, J.J. DONOHUE and S. LEVITT (2001, 2004, 2008), C.L. FOOT and C.F. GOETZ (2008), T. 
JOYCE (2004, 2009, 2009a) and J.R. LOTT and J. WHITLEY (2007). – 4 – 
 
the data which have not been satisfactorily solved so far. Section 3 presents a critical survey 
of the third round papers including some summary statistics. It is shown how simple changes 
can produce quite opposite results using the same data. In the final Section 4 we draw some 
conclusions about the usefulness of statistical arguments in policy debates, but also on the 
moral questions involved in this particular debate. The reason for the latter discussion is that, 
in contrast to all earlier papers where those authors defending the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment are keen to mention that this does not imply that this kind of punishment is justi 
fied,
12) some authors now claim that due to its deterrent effect capital punishment might even 
be morally required.
13) 
2  Some Stylised Facts and Easy Estimates 
[10]  The results of R.D. ADLER and M. SUMMERS are derived from a simple OLS regres 
sion.
14) Using contemporaneous execution data we get for the period from 1979 to 2004:
15) 
(1)  HOMt   =   22614  –  71.880 EXECt  +  ut 
   (33.90)  ( 4.98) 
2 R  =  0.487,  D. W.  =  0.338,  Q(4)  =  37.926***,  AIC  =  18.215, 
with 
HOM  homicides per 100'000 inhabitants, 
EXEC  number of executions. 
The values of the Durbin Watson test as well as of the Q statistic indicate that the estimated 
residuals are highly correlated. Further examination of the residuals indicates second order 
autocorrelation. Thus, even if the true relation would be a simple bivariate one, the signifi 
cance of the estimated parameters would be highly dubious. The easiest way to take this into 
account is to perform a second order Cochrane Orcutt transformation. This leads to the fol 
lowing estimates: 
(2)  HOMt   =   22246  –  15.378 EXECt  +  ut 
   (14.11)  ( 1.27) 
ut   =   1.459 ut 1  –  0.605 ut 2  +  εt , 
   (8.21)  ( 3.32) 
                                                 
 12.  See, for example, I. EHRLICH (1975, p. 416), but also J. SHEPHERD (2009) 
 13.  See the discussion between C.S. SUNSTEIN and A. VERMEULE (2005, 2005a), C.S. STREIKER (2005) and 
D.R. WILLIAMS (2006) mentioned in Section 4 below. 
 14.  Similar regressions are performed by H. DEZHBAKHSH and J.M. SHEPHERD (2006) for the period from 1960 
to 2000 and the two sub periods from 1960 to 1976 and from 1977 to 2000 to get “exploratory evidence” 
(p. 518). 
 15.  The numbers in parentheses are the estimated t statistics. D. W. is the result of the Durbin Watson test for 
autocorrelation of the residuals, Q(k) the Box Ljung Q statistic with k degrees of freedom, AIC the value of 
the Akaike criterion. '***', '**', '*' or 
('*'
) denote significance at the 0.1, 1. 5, or 10 percent levels, respec 
tively. The results are derived with EViews, Version 5.1. The sources of the data are given in the Appendix. – 5 – 
 
2 R  =  0.886,  D. W.  =  1.957,  Q(2)  =  1.762, AIC  =  16.782. 
According to all statistical criteria, this seems to be a much more reliable equation. However, 
the estimated coefficient of the number of executions is much smaller and no longer statisti 
cally significant at any conventional significance level. 
[11]  Another possibility to take the autocorrelation into account is to include lagged depend 
ent variables. This leads to the following result: 
(3)  HOMt   =   5040 +  1.262 HOMt 1  –  0.484 HOMt 2  –  17.930 EXECt  +  ut 
   (2.71)  (6.63)  ( 2.79)  ( 2.08) 
2 R  =  0.897,  D. W.  =  1.878,  Q(2)  =  0.789,  AIC  =  16.674, 
with the following long run solution: 
(3a)  HOM   =   22685  –  80.707 EXEC . 
  (15.85)  ( 2.37) 
Again, according to the statistical criteria, this is a much more reliable result than equation 
(1). It is even slightly better than equation (2), though the differences are very small and 
would never prove to be statistically significant if a formal test were to be applied. On the 
other hand, the estimated long run effect of the execution variable is now even slightly higher 
than in equation (1), and both coefficients are significantly different from zero at the five per 
cent level. Thus, it is possible to get very different results for two plausible specifications for 
the autocorrelation of the error term in model (1) that are very close together according to 
conventional statistical criteria. 
[12]  We get quite similar results if we follow the suggestion of R.D. ADLER and M. SUM 
MERS to use lagged values of the execution variable in order to take account of the time delay 
between cause and effect. Using again OLS we get: 
(1')  HOMt   =   22479  –  72.722 EXECt 1  +  ut 
   (36.42)  ( 5.26) 
2 R  =  0.517,  D. W.  =  0.516,  Q(4)  =  28.687***,  AIC  =  18.158. 
The coefficient of the execution variable and its significance are now somewhat higher, but 
there is still considerable autocorrelation in the estimated residuals. Performing  a second or 
der Cochrane Orcutt transformation we get: 
(2')  HOMt   =   19161  +  10.490 EXECt 1  +  ut 
   (10.534)  (0.89) 
ut   =   1.533 ut 1  –  0.650 ut 2  +  εt , 
  (9.12)  ( 3.75) 
2 R  =  0.881,  D. W.  =  1.922,  Q(2)  =  0.579,  AIC  =  16.821. – 6 – 
 
Again, according to all statistical criteria, this seems to be a much more reliable equation. But 
the estimated coefficient of the number of execution is now even positive but, of course, not 
statistically  significant  at  any  conventional  significance  level.  Nevertheless,  this  estimate 
would rather support the brutalisation than the deterrence hypothesis. 
[13]  As before, we get quite different results if we include lagged dependent variables. Then 
we get: 
(3')  HOMt   =   4960 +  1.329 HOMt 1  –  0.555 HOMt 2  –  14.728 EXECt 1  +  ut 
   (2.36)  (7.03)  ( 3.24)  ( 1.61) 
2 R  =  0.890,  D. W.  =  2.039,  Q(2)  =  0.942,  AIC  =  16.742, 
with the following long run solution: 
(3a')  HOM   =   22017  –  65.372 EXEC . 
  (16.374)  ( 2.09) 
In this estimate, the coefficient of the execution variable has still its negative sign but its sig 
nificance is below the 10 percent level. In the long run equation, it is, however, still signifi 
cant at the five percent level. Thus, we find again the situation that, taking the autocorrelation 
of the residuals into account, we get two rather different results with equally plausible specifi 
















Figure 2:   Executions and homicides, U.S.A., 1900 – 2008 – 7 – 
 
[14]  The results depend, however, also on the time period used. As can be seen from Figure 
2, before 1940, the overall correlation was positive (ρ = 0.321).
16) After 1940, the overall cor 
relation is negative (ρ =  0.635). But there are, nevertheless, considerable sub periods with a 
positive correlation. As the following example for the 25 years from 1971 to 1995 shows, it is 
even possible to get significant positive results when taking the autocorrelation of the residu 
als into account: 
(2'')  HOMt   =   20314  +  53.595 EXECt 1  +  ut 
  (31.23)  (2.16) 
ut   =   1.208 ut 1  –  0.528 ut 2 
   (6.67)  ( 3.33) 
2 R  =  0.783,  D. W.  =  2.035,  Q(2)  =  0.857, AIC  =  16.637. 
Taken literally, this equation would imply that every execution leads to 54 additional homi 
cides. If we include lagged dependent variables we get similar results, though the statistical 
criteria indicate that this estimation is slightly inferior and the execution variable significant 
only at the 10 percent level and only in the long run equation: 
(3'')  HOMt   =   6949 +  1.152 HOMt 1  –  0.4.98 HOMt 2  + 28.468 EXECt 1  +  ut 
  (3.29)  (6.06)  ( 2.88)  (1.61) 
2 R  =  0.763,  D. W.  =  1.951,  Q(2)  =  1.752,  AIC  =  16.726, 
with the long run solution: 
(3a'')  HOM   =   20046  +  82.128 EXEC , 
  (25.71)  (1.74) 
which implies that every execution leads to 82 additional murders in the long run. Thus, even 
if, given the data from 1940 onwards, most sub samples show a negative correlation between 
homicides and executions, it is possible to find sub periods showing the opposite picture. 
Everybody who wants to claim that this negative correlation represents a causal relation has to 
provide  a  convincing  explanation  for  the  existence  of  sub periods  showing  the  opposite 
(causal) relation. 
[15]  Figure 3 shows the t statistics of the execution variable if we perform rolling regres 
sions over 25 year periods from 1900 to 2008. If we perform simple OLS estimations, de 
pending on the sub period we chose, we can get rather negative values, but also high positive 
ones.
 If we model the residual process as AR(2), we hardly get any significant results. If we 
include the lagged endogenous variable up to the second order, we find some significantly 
negative results. The estimated coefficients vary even more dramatically: between  225 and 
132 in the case of the simple OLS regression, between  20 and 54 if we apply the Cochrane 
Orcutt procedure, and between  4241 and 4092 if we include the two lagged endogenous vari 
                                                 
 16.  Because the official homicide data before 1920 is highly problematic to estimate the number of homicides 
we use the corrected homicide rates given in D.L. ECKBERG (1995) for the beginning of the 20
th century. – 8 – 
 
ables.
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Simple OLS estimates
AR(2) error processes
 Model with lagged
endogenous variable
 
Figure 3:   t-statistics of rolling regressions 
[16]  That most sub periods of the recent decades show a negative correlation (but some sub 
periods a positive one) between homicides and executions is just one particular stylised fact of 
the relation between these two variables. A second one, shown in Figure 4 for the period be 
tween 1977 and 2007, i.e. after the suspension by the Supreme Court ended in 1976, is that 
those states that do not use the death penalty have consistently lower homicide rates than 
those which execute people. This should be disturbing for anybody defending the deterrence 
hypothesis. It might, however, be at least partly due to the fact that reverse causality exists: 
those states with higher homicide rates might seem to be more induced to use the death pen 
alty than those with lower rates. Moreover, both series are very highly correlated, with a cor 
relation coefficient of 0.918. In any case, however, if executions have a deterrent effect on 
murders, this effect should be larger in states with than in states without the death penalty.  
[17]  To test this, we used a principal component analysis. The first component represents the 
common movement of both series, while the second one takes up the difference. If we regress 
the two series on the first component (PC1), we get the following estimates for the homicide 
rates in states with (HOMRW) executions for the period from 1977 to 2007, i.e. after the 
moratorium ended:
18) 
                                                 
 17.  This is the coefficient in the long run equation corresponding to relation (3a'').  
 18.  If we regress the homicide rate in states without executions on the first component, we get a similar picture, 
with identical values for the R
2 and the t statistic of the principal component as well as the Durbin Watson 
and Q statistics. To take account of the autocorrelation in the residuals we use for all following models het 
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U.S. states with death penalty
U.S. states without death penalty
 
Figure 4:   Homicides rates in U.S. States with and without death penalty, 1977 – 2007 
(4a)  HOMRWt   =   8.034  +  1.202 PC1t  +  ut 
  (176.71)  (48.25) 
2 R  =  0.959,  D. W.  =  0.305,  Q(4)  =  36.923***,  AIC  =  0.812. 
If executions make a difference between murder rates in the states with and without the death 
penalty, the second principal component (PC2) that takes account of the differences between 
the two series should be influenced by the number of executions. Performing the correspond 
ing regression we get: 
(4b)  PC2t   =  – 0.066  +  0.002 EXECt 1  +  ut 
   ( 0.11)  (0.98) 
2 R  =   0.003,  D. W.  =  0.302,  Q(4)  =  38.550***,  AIC  =  0.413. 
From these estimates it is obvious that the number of executions has no impact whatsoever on 
the difference in the developments of homicide rates of states with and without executions. 
[18]  We get a corresponding result if we regress the difference in the homicide rate between 
states with and without death penalty (DIFF) on the (lagged) number of executions: 
(5)  Difft   =  1.645  –  0.002 EXECt 1  +  ut 
  (6.60)  ( 0.40) 
2 R  =   0.030,  D. W.  =  0.292,  Q(4)  =  45.410***,  AIC  =  2.277. 
The estimated coefficient is far from any significance level. Because there is high autocorrela 
tion in the estimated residuals, we also employed the two methods  to correct for it with the 
following outcome:  – 10 – 
 
(6)  Difft   =  1.356  – 0.002 EXECt 1  +  ut,  ut   =   0.860 ut 1  +  εt , 
  (2.37)  (0.78)  (9.03) 
2 R  =  0.711,  D. W.  =  1.484,  Q(3)  =  5.109,  AIC  =  1.034, 
or: 
(7)  Difft   =  0.213  +  0.852 DFFt 1  + 0.001 EXECt 1  +  ut 
  (1.07)  (8.57)  (0.23) 
2 R  =  0.705,  D. W.  =  1.546,  Q(3)  =  4.570,  AIC  =  1.054 
with its long run solution: 
(7a)  Diff   =   1.440  +  0.004 EXEC . 
  (1.90)  (0.23) 
We get the same picture again and again: The number of executions cannot explain the differ 
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Figure 5:   Homicides rates in the U.S. and in Canada, 1977 – 2005 
[19]  A third stylised fact is that homicide rates are consistently lower in Canada compared 
with the United States.
19) Figure 5 shows this for the period from 1977 to 2005. While the last 
execution was in 1962, death penalty was officially abolished in 1976. Thus, Figure 4 shows 
the period after Canada abolished the death penalty.  
[20]  The correlation between both series is much lower than the one between the different 
U.S. states. It is, however, still 0.758, indicating that there is considerable common movement 
                                                 
 19.  For the development in Canada, but also in the U.S., see also A.K. DILLS, J. MIRON and G. SUMMERS 
(2010). – 11 – 
 
between the developments in the two countries. Thus, we can perform the same test as before. 
Estimating principal components and regressing the two homicide series on the first compo 
nent we get for the U.S. homicide rate (HOMRUS): 
(8a)  HOMRUSt   =   7.917  +  1.099 PC1t  +  ut 
  (76.09)  (16.79) 
2 R  =  0.875,  D. W.  =  0.935,  Q(4)  =  7.669,  AIC  =  1.746. 
[21]  The very high value of the adjusted multiple correlation coefficient indicates that there 
is a rather strong common development of the homicide rates of the two countries, despite the 
different position with regard to death penalty. The regression of the second principal compo 
nent that represents the differences between the two countries on the number of executions in 
the United States leads to 
(8b)  PC2t   =  – 0.018  +  0.0005 EXECt 1  +  ut 
   ( 0.11)  (0.20) 
2 R  =   0.036,  D. W.  =  0.937,  Q(4)  =  7.737,  AIC  =  1.556. 
Thus, similar to the results for the U.S. states, we find that, taking into account the common 
movements between the two countries, the number of executions in the United States does not 
have any impact at all on the difference of the development of the murder rates between the 
two countries.  
[22]  Thus, proponents of the death penalty in the United States do have to give convincing 
answers to four questions: 
(i)  Why is the homicide rate in those U.S. states which do not apply the death penalty con 
sistently lower compared to those states applying it? 
(ii)  Why does the number of executions not have an impact on the difference in the devel 
opment of the homicide rates between those states which do not apply the death penalty 
compared to those states applying it? 
(iii)  Why is the homicide rate in Canada consistently lower than in the United States despite 
the fact that Canada does not apply the death penalty but the United States does? 
(iv)  Why does the number of executions not have an impact on the difference in the devel 
opment of the homicide rates between Canada and the United States despite the fact that 
Canada does not apply the death penalty but the United States does? 
So far, no convincing answers have been given to these four questions. 
3  A Critical Survey of the Recent Literature 
[23]  The main participants in the new debate are three groups of authors.
20) H. DEZHBAKHSH, 
P. RUBIN and J.M. SHEPHERD (2003)
21) as well as H.N. MOCAN and R.K. GITTINGS (2003), 
                                                 
 20.  An overview of the different studies is given in Table A1 in the Appendix. – 12 – 
 
defend the deterrence hypothesis. J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2005, 2009) as well as L. 
KATZ, S.D. LEVITT and E. SHUSTOROVICH (2003), J. FAGAN (2005, 2006), J. FAGAN, F.E. ZIM 
RING and A. GELLER (2006) question it.
22) Finally, J.M. SHEPHERD (2005) presents results in 
favour of the deterrence as well as the brutalisation effects and tries to explain why these dif 
ferent results occur. When discussing these papers, to make the results comparable we con 
centrate on the mean of the estimated t statistics of the execution variable.
23) 
[24]  H. DEZHBAKHSH, P. RUBIN and J.M. SHEPHERD (2003) use county level data from 3054 
US counties over the period from 1977 to 1996. They use a linear model for the murder rate 
with county fixed effects and different specifications of the deterrence variable.
24) They in 
clude the aggravated assault rate as well as the robbery rate as explanatory variables and use 
Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) to instrument these two variables. They present altogether 
48 estimates of the effect of the conditional probability of execution on the murder rate with a 
mean t statistic of  5.47 and a standard deviation of 4.83.
25) Their conclusion from their re 
sults is “that each execution has resulted, on average, in eighteen fewer murders” (p. 369). 
These results were criticised by J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2005). Their main arguments 
are about the instruments used and about the influence of Texas and California on the results; 
the two states which have by far the highest number of executions. Their re estimation leads 
to quite different results: the mean t statistic is  1.43 with a standard deviation of 11.17.
26)  
[25]  A  second  paper  from  this  group  of  authors  is  by  J.M.  SHEPHERD  (2004).  She  uses 
monthly state level data for the period from 1977 to 1999 and, including state fixed effects, 
estimates linear least squares models as well as negative binomial regressions for the murder 
rate. The mean of their 32 estimated t statistics is 3.17 with a standard deviation of 2.08. The 
linear model tells her that in 1999 each execution prevented about three homicides, and addi 
tional 4.5 homicides have been prevented in this year by each death penalty sentence.
27) 
[26]  Similar evidence is presented by H. DEZHBAKHSH and J.M. SHEPHERD (2006). Aside 
from some ‘exploratory’ time series regressions for the period from 1960 to 2000 they use 
                                                                                                                                                          
 21.  See also H. DEZHBAKHSH, and J.M. SHEPHERD (2006), H. DEZHBAKHSH and P. RUBIN (2007), P.R. ZIM 
MERMANN (2004, 2006) as well as J.M. SHEPHERD (2004). 
 22.  Similar results which are, however, not discussed by the authors are presented in J.R. LOTT and J. WHITLEY 
(2007).  
 23.  Because statistical significance does not always imply economic significance as well, an obvious alterna 
tive would be to ask how many lives are saved by each execution. However, these data are only provided in 
some of the studies, and we would not be able to distinguish between statistically significant and insignifi 
cant effects.  
 24.  They report that the results are robust with respect to changes of the functional form. 
 25.  Given the number of observations, a t test whether this mean is significantly different from zero would lead 
to a highly significant result. Such a test assumes, however, that the observations are independent. This as 
sumption is, of course, strongly violated in this situation. Thus, such a test cannot be applied here. In order 
to perform a meaningful test, an assumption about the correlation between the estimated t values would be 
necessary. 
 26.  In calculating the average t statistics, those estimates exactly reproducing the results of other authors are 
always excluded. 
 27.  See J.M. SHEPHERD (2004, p. 308). – 13 – 
 
state level data from 1960 to 2000. They use a linear model with the current and lagged num 
ber of executions as deterrence variable and include state fixed effects. The mean t statistic of 
their 9 time series and 17 panel estimates is  5.81 with a standard deviation of 2.46. Accord 
ing to these estimates, each execution saves about eight lives. These results are also criticised 
by J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2005). Using the same data set, they show that using other 
measures of the executions’ risk the deterrence variable is no longer significant. The mean t 
statistic reported is  0.767 with a standard deviation of 1.01. This criticism is contradicted by 
H. DEZHBAKHSH and P. RUBIN (2007). Taking up the suggestions of J.J. DONOHUE and J. 
WOLFERS (2005) they present 47 different estimates with a mean t statistic of  3.62 and a 
standard deviation of 2.94. They accuse J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2005) of data mining 
and only emphasising those few results which do not indicate a significant deterrence effect. 
[27]  Another paper is by H.N. MOCAN and R.K. GITTINGS (2003). They use state data from 
the years from 1977 to 1999 and get an average t statistic of their 11 coefficients of  1.98 with 
a standard deviation of 0.24. Their conclusion is that every execution prevents about five 
homicides. This paper is again criticised by J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2005). Aside from 
correcting some programming errors, the main dispute between the two groups is about the 
construction of the deterrence variable. To construct the murder ratios, H.N. MOCAN and R.K. 
GITTINGS (2003) construct the probability of execution as the relation between the number of 
last year’s executions and the number of death sentences seven years ago. The justification 
they provide for this procedure is that the average time length on the death row is six years. 
J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2005) question this because it is highly implausible that a po 
tential offender is informed about the number of death sentences seven years ago in order to 
perform this calculation. Therefore, citing the argument of P.R. ZIMMERMANN (2003, p. 170) 
“that any truly meaningful assessment a potential murderer makes” on the probability of an 
execution “is likely to be based on the most recent information available to him/her”, they use 
the relation of last year’s executions to last year’s death sentences. Applying this measure, 
their re estimation leads to a mean t statistic of  0.64 with a standard deviation of 1.21. These 
results are more or less confirmed by H.N. MOCAN and R.K. GITTINGS (2006) who replicate 
many models using the specification of J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2005) and find insig 
nificant results in most cases. However, they insist that their measure is correct and perform 
ing another 195 regressions they show that their measure is insofar robust as a delay of four or 
five years does not alter the results qualitatively; excluding the specifications of J.J. DONOHUE 
and J. WOLFERS (2005) their mean t statistic is  1.96 with a standard deviation of 0.83. The 
argument for a four or five years lag is, however, hardly more convincing than the one for a 
six years lag; it is still implausible that potential offenders use this information for their calcu 
lations.
28) 
[28]  The data of H.N. MOCAN and R.K. GITTINGS (2003) are also used by J. FAGAN (2006). 
However, he estimates the model also for other specifications concerning the deterrence vari 
able, data sources, or eliminating Texas from the data. This results in 13 estimates with a 
mean of  1.16 and a standard deviation of 1.17. In his paper he criticises the same studies that 
                                                 
 28.  See also A.K. DILLS, J.A. MIRON and G. SUMMERS (2008, p. 10, FN 13): “their case for the assumed lag is 
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are also discussed in the current paper and concludes that “this cohort of studies and research 
ers, like Ehrlich before them, has created unjustified confidence in the minds of legislators, 
death penalty advocates, and a small group of legal scholars about the capacity of death sen 
tences and executions to deter murder” (p. 319). 
[29]  A further critique of the studies postulating a deterrence effect is provided in J. FAGAN, 
F.E. ZIMRING and A. GELLER (2006). They criticise the data that have been used so far, be 
cause they do not distinguish between those homicides that are punishable by death and the 
other ones. Using state level panel data from 1978 to 2000, restricting the murder rates on 
those homicides that are punishable by death, and estimating linear as well as Poisson regres 
sions, they do not find a significant effect of the existence of a death penalty statute or of the 
number of executions lagged one or two years on felony homicide rates. The mean of their 24 
estimated t statistics is  0.31 with a standard deviation of 1.24. 
[30]  Another author who finds, however, a significant deterrent effect is P.R. ZIMMERMANN 
(2004, 2006). In his 2004 paper he employs a panel of state level data from 1978 to 1997. He 
takes into account the potential effect of murders on the probability of execution and com 
pares the results of the t statistics of four OLS with two TSLS estimates. While the mean of 
the OLS estimates is  1.31 with a standard deviation of 0.24, the mean of the TSLS estimates 
is  2.59. According to J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2005, p. 835), P.R. ZIMMERMANN’s 
(2004) most preferred specification implies that every execution saves 19 lives, with a confi 
dence interval from 7 to 31 lives. Re estimating this equation and clustering the standard er 
rors  according  to  states  in  order  to  take  account  of  autocorrelation  of  the  residuals,  J.J. 
DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2005) derive, however, an interval from saving 54 lives to caus 
ing 23 additional homicides per execution, i.e. the deterrence effect is no longer statistically 
significant. P.R. ZIMMERMANN (2009), on the other hand, suspects that clustering might not be 
the appropriate measure to cope with the autocorrelation of the residuals and, using alternative 
methods, finds again significant results of the deterrent effect, but only as long as the deter 
rence effect is measured by the probability of execution given conviction. If it is measured by 
the probability of conviction given arrest, the estimated coefficients are still negative but no 
longer significantly different from zero. 
[31]  In P.R. ZIMMERMANN (2006) it is investigated whether the method by which the death 
penalty is effected has an effect on the deterrence. Using a panel of state level data from 1978 
to 2000, only electrocution has a deterrent effect; none of the other four methods, neither le 
thal injection, nor gas chamber asphyxiation, nor hanging, nor firing squad has a statistically 
significant effect. Thus, his average t statistic is  1.05 with a standard deviation of 1.19. Cor 
respondingly, he argues against the change from electrocution to lethal injection that took 
place in several death penalty states if one hopes that capital punishment has a deterrent effect 
on potential murderers.  
[32]  Similar, but even more astonishing results are presented by R.B. EKELUND et al. (2006), 
for the period from 1995 to 1999. While the existence of the death penalty raises the murder 
rate, executions and, in particular electrocutions diminish it. J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS 
(2009, p. 271f.) comment this result by noticing that the sheer effect of the existence of the 
death penalty is rather large and the estimated effect even of the executions by electrocution is – 15 – 
 
so small, that many more murderers would have had to be executed than even in Texas in the 
years considered in order to render the total effect negative, i.e. to get a deterrent effect of the 
death penalty. A second result of R.B. EKELUND et al. (2006) is that multiple murders are not 
deterred at all: all coefficients, not only those of the existence of death penalty, but also those 
of the executions have the ‘wrong’ negative sign, and 15 out of the 16 estimated coefficients 
are highly significant. While this is compatible with a strong brutalisation effect, the authors 
explain their results by the fact that there is no deterrence currently for murders after the first 
one, and, referring to the torture practices of the Middle Ages, they demand that one should 
think of establishing forms of marginal deterrence in the application of capital punishment. 
[33]  While these studies (at least implicitly) assume that, aside from what is reflected by the 
state fixed effects, the effects of capital punishment are identical in all states, J. SHEPHERD 
(2005) finds different results for different states. She strongly believes in the deterrence effect, 
but she also takes brutalisation into account. And she also looks for an explanation for the 
often contradictory results that have been produced. Employing the same data of 3054 coun 
ties over the time period from 1977 to 1996 as in H. DEZHBAKHSH, P. RUBIN and J.M. SHEP 
HERD (2003), she is able to perform separate panel estimates for the different states. Accord 
ing to these results, in six states executions have a deterrent effect, where the number of saved 
lives per execution runs from 6 in Nevada to 61 in South Carolina. In contrast to this, 13 
states show a brutalisation effect, from 3 additional murders in Oklahoma to 175 in Utah and 
Oregon. In the remaining eight states implementing the death penalty, there is no significant 
effect. She gets similar results using monthly state level data from 1977 to 1999; there are six 
states with a deterrent effect and eight states with a brutalisation effect, while the remaining 
13 states do not show any significant effect. Using state level annual data the number of states 
with a significant effect is even smaller; there are five states with a significant deterrence and 
another five states with a significant brutalisation effect. 
[34]  The solution she suggests for this puzzle is a threshold effect: brutalisation as well as 
deterrence are effective. Deterrence is, however, nonlinear; a certain number of executions is 
necessary for it to become relevant, because the marginal deterrence effect increases with the 
number of executions. If there are only rather few executions in a state, the brutalization effect 
dominates, if there are some more, both effects cancel each other, and if there were more than 
about 9 executions in the observation period, deterrence dominates. Actually, she shows that 
those states with a significant deterrence effect had, at the 90 percent confidence level, sig 
nificantly more executions than the remaining states implementing the death penalty. 
[35]  Another differentiation was undertaken by M. FRAKES and M. HARDING (2009). They 
ask for the effect of extending the death penalty eligibility to murders of youth victims and 
find a significant deterrent effect. They find a similar, but much less significant effect for the 
eligibility of multiple victim murders, and insignificant, but numerically large effects with the 
‘wrong’ sign for narcotic related murders and those with victims over 70 years of age. They 
do not, however, find a general deterrent effect of capital punishment. Thus, their results are 
rather mixed. 
[36]  Aside from the critique in J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2005) and the papers by J. 
FAGAN and his co authors, there are also other papers which do not find a significant deter – 16 – 
 
rence effect. Using state level data, L. KATZ, S.D. LEVITT and E. SHUSTOROVICH (2003) esti 
mate a linear model of the murder rate between 1950 and 1990. They present 22 t statistics 
for their deterrence variable with a mean of  0.20 and a standard deviation of 1.42. A similar 
result is presented by J.R. LOTT and J. WHITLEY (2007). Using state level data from the pe 
riod from 1976 to 1998 and applying Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions, their inten 
tion is to show that legalised abortion increased crime. A by product of their attempt is, how 
ever, the result that the execution rate does not have a significant impact on the murder rate: 
the 5 corresponding t statistics have a mean of  0.05 and a standard deviation of 0.24. Finally, 
T. KOVANDZIC, L.M. VIERAITIS and D.P. BOOTS (2009), using state level data from 1977 to 
2006 and employing fourteen different statistical models and seven different indicators of the 
deterrence effect, present altogether 98 estimated coefficients out of which only four are sta 
tistically different from zero at the 5 percent level. The average t statistic of their models is 
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Figure 6:   Distributions of the t-statistics 
[37]  Figure 6 shows the distributions of the t statistics of the three groups. The results differ 
widely, and it is rather difficult to draw firm conclusions. Taking all results together, the only 
– admittedly weak – indication for the existence of a deterrence effect of death penalty is the 
fact that the mean of the reported t statistics is negative even in those papers coming to the 
conclusion that executions are non deterring.
30) The only papers with positive means are by J. 
SHEPHERD (2005) and, despite that they believe in the deterrence effect, by R.B. EKELUND et 
                                                 
 29.  R. HJALMARSSON (2009) who uses daily time series data for 1999 to 2004 for three Texas cities, Houston, 
Dallas and San Antonio, does not find a ‘local effect’ of executions on homicides. 
 30.  The mean of these t statistics is  0.780 with a standard deviation of 5.710. The mean of the t statistics in 
those studies claiming a significant deterrence effects is  2.879 with a standard deviation of 2.703. See also 
the summary of the t statistics in Table A1 of the Appendix. – 17 – 
 
al. (2006). If the true value would be zero, we should more often observe a (non significant) 
positive mean, in particular in those studies denying a deterrent effect.  
[38]  Despite the fact that the econometric techniques employed in these studies are much 
more advanced than those in the first two waves, serious methodological problems remain. 
First of all, there are still serious data problems. The results are heavily dependent on meas 
ures of the deterrence variable as, for example, the rather different results employing the H.N. 
MOCAN and R.K. GITTINGS (2003) data show. Moreover, as J. FAGAN, F.E. ZIMRING and A. 
GELLER (2006) show, the correct specification of the dependent variable is also a major prob 
lem. The functional form of the equation does not, on the other hand, seem to be a major 
problem: those studies that employ log linear instead of linear specifications do not produce 
consistently different results. 
[39]  There are, however, other serious econometric problems that have only been considered 
in some of the studies and at least were not always solved convincingly. One of the major 
problems  is  simultaneity.  Potential  offenders  might  choose  from  a  portfolio  of  different 
criminal acts. Thus, a system of equations containing a separate equation for every punishable 
act would be appropriate. If only one equation, i.e. the one for murder rates, is estimated, the 
usual cure is to employ instrumental variable estimates. However, as several studies show, the 
question which variables are well suited for being an instrument is highly debatable, and the 
results are largely dependent on the instruments used.  
[40]  Another major problem in this respect is the possible instantaneous and/or feedback 
relation between murders and executions; executions might not only have an effect on murder 
rates but murder rates also on executions. In the time domain, this might not be considered as 
being an important problem because, if they have any impact, murder rates should have a 
positive effect on executions. Thus, not taking this into account might downward bias the es 
timated coefficients of the deterrence variables and their t statistics. The considerable increase 
of the estimated parameters in the model of P.R. ZIMMERMANN (2006) by switching from 
OLS to TSLS might point in this direction.  
[41]  There  is,  however,  another  problem  in  this  respect.  All  panel  studies  use  state  (or 
county) fixed effects. Thus, different average levels of murder rates between the states are not 
explained but represented by dummy variables. Thus, all that can be explained by these re 
gressions are reactions over time. The more interesting question as to whether states with the 
death penalty have in the long run higher or lower murder rates than those that do not execute 
cannot be answered by these models. Given the fact mentioned above that those states without 
the death penalty have consistently lower murder rates than those with, this is a serious prob 
lem. Because even if an increase of executions deters murderers in the short run, there might 
be a long run brutalisation effect that is not reflected in the models. Thus, we have again a 
serious simultaneity problem: states might have less need for the death penalty if their murder 
rate is lower, but fewer executions might also lead to less brutalisation.  
[42]  Attempts in this direction have been done by investigating the effect of the moratorium 
or its lifting in 1976, respectively. Several studies take this into account, partly by introducing 
dummy variables for the existence of a death penalty statute and partly by considering the re – 18 – 
 
introduction of the death penalty in different states as natural experiments. However, the re 
sults of those studies are also far from being univocal. H. DEZHBAKHSH and J.M. SHEPHERD 
(2006) find that the abolition of the death penalty was associated with an increase while its re 
introduction led to a (smaller) decrease of homicides, but J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS 
(2005) using a difference in difference approach do not find any evidence in this respect. 
Moreover, DEZHBAKHSH and J.M. SHEPHERD (2006) find a significant positive effect of the 
moratorium on murder rates in their state panel date regression results, while the results of J. 
FAGAN, F.E. ZIMRING and A. GELLER (2006) mentioned above do not point in this direction. 
Finally, J.K. COCHRANE and M.B. CHAMLIN (2000) investigate the effects of re introducing 
capital punishment in California in 1992. Using an ARIMA approach they find “a significant 
decline in the level of non stranger felony murders and a significant increase of argument 
based murders of strangers in the period following the [first] execution” (p. 685) on April 21 
and, therefore, a deterrence as well as a brutalisation effect. But while the brutalisation effect 
remained permanent and was even increasing over time, the deterrent effect declined over 
time and appeared, therefore, “to be contingent on an additional, perhaps continuous applica 
tion” (p. 701) of the death penalty. Nevertheless, the net effect of executions on homicide was 
zero.
31)  
4  Concluding Remarks 
[43]  A critical and cautious examination of these results leads to the conviction that we can 
not draw any strong conclusions. While there is some evidence that a deterrent effect might 
exist, it is too fragile to be certain. Furthermore, the possible quantitative effect usually meas 
ured by the number of homicides prevented by each execution is so uncertain that it is diffi 
cult to conclude anything that would be relevant for policy purposes.
32) Of course, defenders 
of the death penalty as G.S. BECKER (2006) or R.A. POSNER (2006) will still insist that the 
econometric evidence is strong enough to justify the belief in a considerable deterrence effect, 
even if they admit that the evidence is far from being perfect.
33) Those who consider the death 
                                                 
 31.  A similar study is performed by W.C. BAILEY (1998) (with reference to J.K. COCHRANE, M.B. CHAMLIN 
and M. SETH (1994)) to investigate the effects of the re introduction of capital punishment in Oklahoma in 
1990. He presents strong evidence for a brutalisation but at best rather weak evidence for a deterrence ef 
fect. 
 32.  See also E. COHEN COLE, J. FAGEN and S. DURLAUF (2009, p. 335) who average the models of H. DEZ 
HBAKHSH, P. RUBIN and J.M. SHEPHERD (2003) with the one of J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2005) and 
reach the conclusion that “evidence of deterrent effects appears, while not inexistent, weak.” 
 33.  See, for example, G.S. BECKER (2006, p. 1): “I support the use of capital punishment because, and only 
because, I believe it deters murders. … The available data are quite limited, however, so one should not 
base any conclusion solely on the econometric evidence. Still, I believe the preponderance of evidence does 
indicate that capital punishment deters, … Of course, public policy on punishments cannot wait until the 
evidence is perfect. Even with the limited quantitative evidence available, there are good reasons to believe 
that capital punishment deters murder. Most people, and murders in particular, fear death, especially when 
it follows swiftly and with considerable certainty following the commission of a murder.” See also P.H. 
RUBIN (2009) who makes it very clear that there has to be a deterrent effect of the death penalty whatever 
econometric analyses show. – 19 – 
 
penalty to be unconstitutional point to the weaknesses of these studies.
34) As the examples of 
J. FAGAN (2005) and J. SHEPHERD (2004a) show, this can lead to contradictory statements in 
testimonies before parliamentary (and other) committees.  
[44]  That social scientists contradict each other in such situations is neither new nor unique: 
there are numerous other such examples.
35) What is more or less unique is the divide between 
economics and the other social sciences: While most (not all) economists believe in the deter 
rent effect of death penalty and defend the evidence presented, most other social scientists, 
including law professors, question the evidence and do not believe that it can justify death 
penalty. Moreover, this debate might be more heated than other ones, but, taking into account 
the issue at stake, “a question of live and death”, to cite I. EHRLICH (1975), this is not at all 
astonishing.  
[45]  The divide between the social sciences is also not surprising. Economists believe in 
incentives more than other social scientists do.
36) They usually believe in the deterrent effect 
of punishment and, therefore, also of capital punishment. The only relevant question for them 
is whether the change from life imprisonment to death penalty has a positive marginal deter 
rence effect. In recent decades, the deterrent effect of criminal law has been questioned by 
psychologists and by people from law departments following them; besides deterrence, there 
are many other reasons why people obey the law.
37) Consequently, the marginal deterrence 
effect of death penalty has been questioned, too. This does not necessarily imply that there is 
no deterrent effect at all. But whether the marginal effect is significant and large enough to 
justify legislation is still a question to be discussed. 
[46]  In recent years, economists learned to take the results of psychologists more seriously, 
developing the new approach of ‘behavioural economics’.
38) There, the effect of deterrence is 
highly questioned as well. Moreover, they learned that in many situations people do not act 
rationally, at least not according to conventional standards of rationality. This holds for mur 
derers, too. But, as R.H. MCADAMS and T.S. ULEN (2009) correctly argue, for deterrence to 
become effective it is sufficient that those who might, but actually do not commit murders are 
deterred. Moreover, even though the reaction of individuals is in many situations weak, be 
                                                 
 34.  See, for example, J. FAGAN (2005, p. 2): “These new studies are fraught with technical and conceptual 
errors: inappropriate methods of statistical analysis, failures to consider all the relevant factors that drive 
murder rates, missing data on key variables in key states, the tyranny of a few outliers and years, weak to 
non existent tests of concurrent effects of incarceration, statistical confounding of murder rates with death 
sentences, failure to consider the general performance of the criminal justice system, and the absence of any 
direct test of deterrence. These studies fail to reach the demanding standards of social science to make such 
strong claims, standards such as replication, responding to counterfactual claims, and basic comparison 
with other scenarios. Some simple examples and contrasts, including the careful analysis of the experience 
in Massachusetts compared to other states, lead to a rejection of the idea that either death sentences or exe 
cutions deter murder.” 
 35.  See, for example, G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (2005) with respect to environmental policy or G. KIRCHGÄSSNER 
(2007) with respect to natural damage insurance in Switzerland.  
 36.  See for this, for example, G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (2005a). 
 37.  See, for example, K. D. OPP (1989), T.R. TYLOR (1990, 1997), P.H. ROBINSON and J.M. DARLEY (2004) or 
A.M. LICHT (2008). 
 38.  See, for example, N. GAROUPA (2003) or R.H. MCADAMS and T.S. ULEN (2009). – 20 – 
 
havioural economists do not reject the notion that sufficiently strong incentives have an im 
pact on human behaviour. Thus, the question at stake here is ‘only’ whether the marginal ef 
fect of a change from lifelong imprisonment to death penalty is a strong enough incentive, 
generally and in particular given today’s situation in the United States. 
[47]  Because of the contradictory evidence that is available there will be no consensus about 
this question, at least not in the near future. The same (as well as other) people will present 
similar evidence as before, with ever improved statistical techniques. There is some hope that 
these improved techniques will lead to some convergence of the results, not only of the meth 
ods, but there is a high probability that this hope which has been frustrated over the last thirty 
years will also be frustrated in the (near) future. There are too many possibilities for different 
specifications which can be justified with arguments of plausibility to expect a full conver 
gence. Selective perceptions will again have the effect that researchers believe in those results 
that seem to be plausible from their a priori point of view.  
[48]  This perception of the scientific process might seem to be rather pessimistic. It is, how 
ever, only realistic. It is partly due to the fact that this is an area where we cannot perform 
controlled experiments, and the quasi natural experiments which are sometimes unintention 
ally conducted by political authorities also do not give clear answers, as the recent history of 
the United States, (and the papers analysing these experiments) show. This is not specific for 
economics and the other social sciences as one might think, because, as K.R. POPPER (1962, p. 
95) writes: “It is a mistake to assume that the objectivity of a science depends on the objectiv 
ity of the scientist. And it is a mistake to believe that the attitude of the natural scientist is 
more objective than that of the social scientist. ... [T]he objectivity of science is not a matter 
of  the  individual  scientists  but  rather  the  social  result  of  their  mutual  criticisms,  of  the 
friendly hostile division of labour among scientists, of their co operation and also of their 
competition.”  
[49]  This mutual criticism is the driving force of scientific progress, and it allows ‘bad re 
search’, theoretical as well as empirical, to be discredited. Thus, ideology or, in other words, 
the personal convictions of the researchers will nearly always play a role, but competition and 
open discussion can (and hopefully will) have the effect that the majority opinion in the scien 
tific community goes into the correct direction in the long run, even if not all members of this 
community will be convinced. M. PLANCK (1933, p. 299) already wrote with respect to scien 
tific progress: “An important scientific innovation rarely makes its way gradually winning 
over and converting its opponents: it rarely happens that Saul becomes Paul. What does hap 
pen is that its opponents gradually die out and that the growing generation is familiarized with 
the idea from the beginning.” This holds generally, for all sciences, but for the issue at stake, 
the discussion about the potential deterrence effect of capital punishment, in particular. Given 
the demands for the precision of scientific advice that are often expressed, this does not seem 
to be very much, but more cannot be expected in a realistic perspective. Moreover, this does 
not imply that policy advice is useless, but if competing experts are asked, it is hardly the case 
that advice is unanimous. Thus, policy advice can clarify facts, and this holds also for econo 
metric estimates of the deterrence effect of capital punishment, but ideology will always also 
play a role. – 21 – 
 
[50]  Besides the disputed facts there is, however, a moral question with respect to capital 
punishment as well, which has also been raised again recently. If, (but only if) capital pun 
ishment deters, the question of its moral justification or rejection becomes more complicated. 
Based on a strong belief in the deterrent effect of the death penalty, C.R. SUNSTEIN and A. 
VERMEULE (2005) defend the position that capital punishment might not only be morally ac 
ceptable but even be morally required. The basis of their argument is the proposition that the 
difference between act and omissions is, for the government as a moral actor, misleading in 
this case (and in other situations as well). The usual example of a ‘tragic decision’ is whether 
it is allowed or even morally obliged to kill an innocent person in order to save the lives of 
several other people. Despite the fact that consequentialism might demand this, it contradicts 
our usual moral intuitions, because it is not allowed to do any harm to an innocent person. A 
murderer is definitely not an innocent person. One might question whether deliberate killing 
of a human person can be morally justified at all, aside from situations of (personal) self 
defence or whether it should, like torture, be negated categorically. If the latter holds, there is 
no possibility to justify the death penalty. Executing murderers might, however, be seen as a 
societal self defence if it really prevents further murders. Then, the problem arises that some 
times innocent people are executed. We do, however, neither know those people who are in 
nocent and, due to judicial errors, are executed, nor those whose lives are saved due to the 
deterrence effect of the death penalty. Thus, we face a new variant of the act versus omission 
problem. 
[51]  Given this situation, C.R. SUNSTEIN and A. VERMEULE (2005) question the distinction 
between acts and omissions in this context (and also in the more general context of public 
policy altogether) and argue in favour of the death penalty because we have to compare on 
both sides ‘statistical lives’, and it saves more lives than it risks. C.S. STREIKER (2005) argues 
against this position from a deontological point of view because “executions constitute a dis 
tinctive moral wrong, (purposeful as opposed to non purposeful killing) and a distinctive kind 
of injustice (unjustified punishment).”
39) In their reply, C.R. SUNSTEIN and A. VERMEULE 
(2005a) reject this by restating the argument that innocent people are involved on both sides, 
that deterrence should play a major role in moral judgements, and “if capital punishment has 
significant  deterrent  effects,  then  the  moral  argument  for  the  ultimate  penalty  is  greatly 
strengthened – even, we think, to the point of raising the possibility that capital punishment 
may be morally required” (p. 857).
40) 
[52]  Even if one does not follow this conclusion, one can hardly reject the notion that deter 
rence should play a major role in legal judgements and, because legal judgments should be 
morally justified, also in moral judgements. Thus, the debate about the possible deterrent ef 
                                                 
 39.  Another interesting aspect raised by her but which cannot be discussed here is that giving up the distinction 
between act and omission with respect to governmental policies would lead to far more extensive govern 
ment interventions than we experience today. 
 40.  D.R. WILLIAMS (2006) argues that the whole debate is futile because it is about ideal systems and does not 
take the reality into account. However, the fundamental question demands an answer even if it is acknow 
ledged that the reality of the death penalty in the United States is far from a (perhaps possible) ideal situa 
tion. To refer to the non ideality of the current situation might be taken as an excuse that an answer is not 
necessary at the moment, it is, however, not a substitute for such an answer. – 22 – 
 
fect of the death penalty is morally relevant, as long as legal judgements are supposed to take 
into account their consequences, a demand that can hardly be rejected. On the other hand, as 
long as the evidence for a serious deterrent effect of the death penalty is so weak, it can hardly 
be used as a justification for this kind of punishment. Moreover, today the most serious mur 
derers internationally are the suicide bombers. They cannot be deterred by the death penalty at 
all. Thus, the potential deterrent effect of the death penalty as well as its role in justifying this 
kind of punishment, collapse with respect to perhaps the worst crimes of all today.  
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Sources of the data 
Executions (U.S.):  Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in 
the U.S. 1608 2002: The Espy File, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions us 
1608 2002 espy file; 




Homicide Rates (U.S., 1900 – 1932):  D.L. ECKBERG (1995) 
Homicide Rates (U.S., 1933 – 2008):  National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statis 
tics, Homicide rates from the Vital Statistics, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/hmrttab
.htm 
Homicide Rates, (U.S., Canada):  Data from J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2005), 
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/donohue/pubsdata.htm. 
Homicide Rates in States with and  Data from J.J. DONOHUE and J. WOLFERS (2005),  
without Death Penalty  http://islandia.law.yale.edu/donohue/pubsdata.htm. 
  
Table A1:   Summary of the t-Statistics of Panel-Studies With State or County Data 
Authors  Journal  Profession  Data  Estimation Method 
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N  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
DEZHBAKHSH, RUBIN and 
SHEPHERD (2003) 
American Law and  
Economic Review  Economics  3054 Counties, 1977 1996  Panel, TSLS  48     5.469    4.833 
DEZHBAKHSH. and RUBIN 
(2007)  mimeo  Economics  States, 1960 2000  Panel, OLS, TSLS  47     3.616    2.936 
DEZHBAKHSH and SHEP 
HERD (2006)  Economic Inquiry  Economics  States, 1960 2000  TS, Panel, OLS, 
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between 1934 and 2000 
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Southern Economic 
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FAGAN (2006)  Ohio State Journal of 
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